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Humanitarian aid does not always achieve its intended outcomes but may have
unintended side-effects which harm rather than help recipient communities in the
long run. In the context of aid, iatrogenic violence refers to circumstances where
aid intended to benefit recipients instead causes social disruption. The relations
between donor and recipient contribute significantly to the outcomes of aid. This
article aims to explore the recipient side of donor–recipient relationships in
humanitarian aid targeting children affected by HIV/AIDS in Makete, Tanzania.
Specific objectives include exploring (i) the lived experiences of the children
who are targeted by the aid, (ii) the lived experiences of related caregivers and
community members and (iii) the responses of local leaders, both non-
governmental organisation (NGO) officers and local government leaders. Forty-
one orphaned children aged 9–18 were involved in 3 one-hour-long
participatory activities. From these, 12 were selected for in-depth interviews.
Four caregivers of orphaned children and 15 key informants (community leaders
and NGO officers) were interviewed. Findings show that the type of aid and
method of distribution are determined by the donors and do not fit well with
local conditions. Examples of iatrogenic violence include conflict and division
between those in the community who receive aid and those who do not,
increasing dependency with a corresponding reduction in self-reliance, criteria
that exclude the most vulnerable children from aid and passivity and non-
participation. Donor-controlled humanitarian aid is causing unintended harm in
the recipient communities.
Keywords: aid; unintended side-effects; donor–recipient relations; vulnerable
children; HIV/AIDS; Tanzania
Introduction
Humanitarian aid does not always achieve its intended outcomes. Indeed, aid may have
unintended side-effects which harm rather than help recipient communities in the long
run. The concept of iatrogenic violence describes a situation where an intervention by a
doctor trying to heal a patient causes more harm than good. In the context of aid, iatro-
genic violence refers to circumstances where aid intended to benefit recipients instead
causes social disruption (McFalls, 2010).
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The global structure of aid has historically caused social disruption. The harm
caused by the neo-liberalist agenda of aid during the ‘Washington Consensus’ years
has been well documented; and even under the post-Washington consensus, the intro-
duction of outcome targets (for example the Millennium Development Goals) ensured
the imposition of neo-liberal values (Mawdsley et al., 2014; Murray and Overton,
2011). The principles outlined in the Paris Declaration of 2005 – ownership, alignment,
harmonisation, results-based management and mutual accountability – are intended to
increase aid effectiveness with recipients seen as ‘partners’ (Mawdsley et al., 2014;
Murray and Overton, 2011).
Civil society is an important implementer of aid at the local level. Katz (2006) out-
lines two contrasting views within neo-Gramscian thought on the role of civil society:
on the one hand it is seen as the counterforce to neo-liberal globalisation, but on the
other hand it is seen as an extension of the state (or ruling authorities). In the latter
view, global civil society is seen as promoting the neo-liberal agenda, but ‘under a
cloak of openness’ (Katz, 2006, p. 335). Mawdsley and colleagues (2014) discuss
the role of civil society within the Paris Declaration framework and note that one sig-
nificant goal of civil society is the strengthening of the human rights approach. Whit-
field and Fraser (2010) list human rights among a series of governance conditions that
were imposed additionally in the 1990s onto the shrunken state structures and further
undermined the independence of recipient governments. Magesan (2013) has studied
the link between ratification of human rights treaties and aid receipts and he contends
that simply ratifying human rights treaties (as opposed to real changes in human rights
behaviours) increases aid received per person both in the short and the long run.
The donor–recipient relationship in humanitarian aid in the HIV/AIDS context will
not only affect the effectiveness of the implementation, but also the lives of those
affected and infected by the disease. As Seckinelgin (2012) notes, the lived experiences
of those living with the disease are seldom considered. This article aims to explore the
recipient side of donor–recipient relationships in humanitarian aid targeting children
affected by HIV/AIDS. Specific objectives include exploring (i) the lived experiences
of the children who are targeted by the aid, (ii) the lived experiences of related care-
givers and community members and (iii) the responses of local leaders, both non-gov-
ernmental organisation (NGO) officers and local government leaders.
Conceptual framework: iatrogenic violence in humanitarian aid in the
HIV/AIDS context
Humanitarian aid – the donor response to crises or states of emergency such as natural
disasters or human-generated conflict situations – forms a particular subset of foreign
aid. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) note that the humanitarian principles of neutrality,
impartiality and humanity are often used by political actors to legitimise their activities.
McFalls (2010) agrees and points out that international agencies use medical metaphors
to legitimise humanitarian aid because medical interventions are seen as exempt from
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ethical critique. He coins some of his own medical metaphors: ‘therapeutic domination’
(where the power differentials in the donor–recipient relations are like those in the
doctor–patient relationship) can lead to ‘iatrogenic violence’ which he describes as
‘social disruption and political violence that results from outside intervention intended
to stop or prevent such violence’ (McFalls, 2010, p. 319). He contends that no matter
what the nature or context of the intervention ‘iatrogenic violence is inherent in the
formal structure of international intervention’ (McFalls, 2010). Nguyen (2005)
echoes McFalls’ sentiment but in a more neutral manner when he asserts that donors
mould social interaction and generate new forms of relations through their use of
NGOs. McFalls extends his description of the violence of humanitarian aid: ‘ . . . thera-
peutic domination not only depersonalises, but decontextualises social relationships.
Without any reference to culture or to history, therapeutic domination reduces social
agents to human bodies’ (2010, p. 323). McFalls’ use of the concept of therapeutic
domination is similar to Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics’ as used by both Nguyen
(2005) and Duffield (2007) to mean the power to promote or undermine life.
Humanitarian aid frequently involves the defining of beneficiaries or target groups
which inevitably involves inclusion and exclusion: those who are eligible for aid are
defined by the criteria of vulnerability and categories of need (Hilhorst and Jansen,
2010). Such social differentiation is an example of both therapeutic domination (the
aid agencies with little reference to cultural context decide who is in and who is out)
and iatrogenic violence (disrupting social relationships). Other forms of iatrogenic vio-
lence include the creation of dependency and stripping local people of their agency
(Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). McFalls (2010, p. 328) describes the logic of the
donors using
. . . the quip ‘the surgery was successful, but the patient died’. The therapeutic structure of
domination also determines the mode of resistance principally as ‘patient noncompli-
ance’: usually passive-aggressive, often self-destructive, and occasionally prone to appar-
ently irrational outbursts directed at ‘caregivers’ . . .
Hilhorst and Jansen (2010, p. 1136) discuss the issue of human rights within humani-
tarian aid and conclude that education about human rights inadvertently leads to ‘a per-
manent sense of dissatisfaction among refugees’ and that the rights discourse has
‘advanced individualisation to the detriment of community solidarity’.
McFalls (2010) concludes that multiple crises have led to a permanent state of emer-
gency which has allowed the governing of humanitarian aid to become a dictatorship
(all-be-it a benevolent one) that is exempt from the challenges and critiques of
normal politics. This dictatorship implies that the principles of the Paris Declaration
are less visible in humanitarian aid.
An example of a seemingly ‘permanent’ crisis is the HIV/AIDS epidemic which is
still treated as an emergency although well into its fourth decade. Duffield (1997,
p. 529), commenting on ‘so-called continuum thinking’ (with humanitarian/relief aid at
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one end and development at the other), notes that government-led infrastructure projects
have been superseded by partnerships with local communities that empower and build
capacity. The HIV epidemic is associated with aid that provides treatment, material
support and technologies to empower individuals living with HIV rather than transform-
ing local public health care systems in Africa to provide the needed services (Nguyen,
2005). Such aid is closer to the humanitarian/relief end of the continuum. However,
HIV/AIDS is also a significant policy area in development aid frameworks like the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Seckinelgin, 2005) and consequently results-
based management that is seen in other aspects of aid is also practised in the context
of HIV. Other aspects of the Paris Declaration are highly visible, at least in theory,
when the language of partnership, ownership and harmonisation is written into global
AIDS policy (see for example the role of partners in implementing male circumcision
for HIV prevention in the report by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2011).
The humanitarian aspect of aid in response to the ‘crisis’ of HIV/AIDS demonstrates
many of the characteristics of therapeutic domination identified by McFalls (2010). The
international organisations (especially UNAIDS and WHO) legitimise their interventions
using the scientific rationality of medicine; the recipients – people affected and infected
by HIV – are seen as passively accepting the policy interventions and biomedical inter-
ventions dominate and seem unrelated to actual lived experiences and cultural contexts of
the recipients (Seckinelgin, 2012). The implication here is that while the language of
global HIV/AIDS policy is partnership (ownership, alignment and mutual accountabil-
ity), the reality is closer to therapeutic domination with donors controlling the nature
and extent of interventions. A note about culture: HIV/AIDS is closely related to sex
and death which are both taboo topics in many cultures making the cultural context extre-
mely significant for the effectiveness of interventions. Seckinelgin (2005) outlines the
clear governance structure for HIV/AIDS (unlike other ‘emergency’ situations) headed
by UNAIDS which co-ordinates the efforts of all UN organisations and is based in
Geneva, not New York, for convenient collaboration with WHO. This governance struc-
ture is influential in several of the large funds which contribute to the ‘emergency’ of
HIV/AIDS, for example, the Global Fund for HIV, Malaria and TB; the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and of course the MDGs. In addition,
several philanthropists, like Bill Gates and Bill Clinton, make significant donations to
the HIV/AIDS emergency. Seckinelgin (2005, p. 359) contends that NGOs have very
little agency in contributing to policy development, instead they are seen as ‘close to
the people’ and are used merely as implementers, as ‘delivery tools’.
Tanzanian context
The introduction of large amounts of aid money must be understood in the context of
the evolving political economy in Tanzania and the changing balance of power
between government (both central and local) and the civil society sector. After
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independence in 1961, Tanzania introduced a unique form of socialism known as
ujamaa which was intended to enable self-reliance rather than dependence on aid
from the West. However, instead of self-reliance, Tanzania has, for decades,
depended heavily on donor support (Rugumamu, 1997). Michael (2004, p. 70)
describes the post-independence expansion of the state in Tanzania: the proliferation
of state structures effectively eliminated ‘the space for autonomous civil society
organization’. In the mid-1980s, with structural adjustment and the introduction of
neo-liberal market forces into the socialist economy, the state was cut back and
civil society began to grow once more (de Graaf, 2005). Since the 1990s, NGOs
in Tanzania have mushroomed (Rueben, 2002). Green (2012, p. 312) notes that
this growth in civil society in Tanzania represents a ‘significant transition in the pol-
itical culture’ towards entrepreneurship and self-interest previously associated with
capitalism. A significant portion of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania
are linked to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which hit the country hard from the mid-
1980s onwards. Local NGOs frequently lack power, fail to secure funding from inter-
national donors and are obliged to cooperate with local government bureaucracy in
order to function in the local environment (Michael, 2004). In addition, they have
to accept what Hearn (2007, p. 1103) calls ‘an external orientation’, they are under
pressure to conform to an agenda other than their own. Prior to the 1990s, district
and local governments in Tanzania had strong control over service provision, but
the growth of civil society has eroded this monopoly (Michael, 2004). District and
local governments have attempted to reign in the CSOs, for example requiring
them to submit reports on their activities, but they have few sanctions should the
CSOs fail to comply. Against the background of the changes in foreign aid described
above and an evolving political economy in the country, Tanzania, in 2008, received
US$58 million from the Global Fund and an additional US$40 million from the Pre-
sident’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to be spent on Orphans and Vul-
nerable Children in the period 2008–2013. PACT (the organisation responsible for
disbursing the money) is working closely with the Department of Social Welfare
(DSW), UNICEF and local NGOs to establish a wide-reaching and sustainable
action programme for the most vulnerable children (MVC)1 in the country.2
Methodology
The findings and analysis in this article are based on data collected between January
2007 and November 2008 in Makete, Tanzania. Makete District in Iringa Region is
part of the pilot community-based MVC programme (overseen by DSW and
UNICEF) which started in 2006 (Government of Tanzania, 2006). Makete is a
1In Tanzania the term ‘most vulnerable children’ is used in preference to the more familiar term
‘orphans and vulnerable children’.
2Personal communication with Programme Officer, PACT, Tanzania, 9 February 2007.
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remote rural area, to the northwest of Njombe, with poor transport and communication
links, high rates of poverty and labour migration, high HIV/AIDS prevalence3 and, con-
sequently, high levels of orphaning. Makete has the country’s highest number of MVC
as a proportion of all children: 17.4 per cent while the average for the country is 5.3 per
cent (Government of Tanzania, 2006, p. 5). MVC in Makete District are the recipients
of funds from PEPFAR and the Global Fund through national NGOs and international
faith-based organisations.
Initial access to the participants was through an NGO working in the area and
through local government officials. There were 3 participant groups: orphans and vul-
nerable children, caregivers and other key informants. Sixty-seven children between
the ages of 9 and 18 were identified by community leaders. The children took part in
3 one-hour-long, participatory activities, with 41 children completing all 3 sessions.
The activities were designed to build rapport with the research team and collect back-
ground data, for example, on the children’s understanding of friendship, responsibil-
ity and becoming an adult. After observation during the activity sessions, 12 children
(between the ages of 12 and 18) were purposefully selected for in-depth interviews
because they were thought to be information-rich and able to articulate their experi-
ences (see Table 1 below for details). The second group, consisting of 4 caregivers of
orphaned and vulnerable children (1 grandfather, 2 grandmothers and 1 aunt), partici-
pated in in-depth interviews. There were visits to 10 households in the village,
including those of all the participating caregivers and 2 of the participating children.
The third group comprised 11 key informants among community leaders such as
primary school teachers, care promoters, the village executive officer, NGO officers,
church leaders and district officials. Data were collected through in-depth interviews
and focus group discussions. In addition, programme officers of the participating
NGOs were interviewed at their headquarters in Dar es Salaam. There were also
interviews with programme officers at UNICEF, PACT and other relevant
organisations.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed in full (Kiswahili as well as English)
and the Kiswahili parts were translated into English. The transcriptions were coded with
the help of Nvivo 8 and thereafter analysed using thematic network analysis (Attride-
Stirling, 2001). Children were asked about the aid they had or had not received, kinship
networks both near and far geographically, other social networks such as friends,
church/mosque and neighbours. Adults were asked about, among other things, the cri-
teria used by NGOs for recruitment, the nature and content of aid, the relationship
between local government and civil society and the response of recipients and non-reci-
pients to aid.
3HIV prevalence in Makete was 13.7 per cent in 2004 when the national prevalence was 8.8 per
cent. Makete District Council Health Department (2004). ‘Comprehensive Council Health Plan
for July 2004– June 2005’. Makete, Government of Tanzania, Ministry of Health, Iringa
Region.
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Ethics
The Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) granted permission to do
the research in Tanzania. Rigorous research ethics, including informed consent, were
followed with all participants who were ensured of their rights to anonymity and con-
fidentiality. The informants were given the opportunity to withdraw from the study at
any time should they so wish. All the child interviewees were given the opportunity to
have one of the community leaders present should they so wish, but none chose to do
so. The interview was the fourth meeting between the researcher and child informant,
so some degree of rapport and trust had been established.
Findings
Impact of HIV/AIDS on social networks
In Makete the impact of HIV/AIDS can be seen in size of the households of the child
interviewees. As shown in Table 1, 8 of the 12 selected orphans’ households consisted
of 2 people only, including the 3 child-headed households. A further 3 households con-
sisted of 3 people only. The cause can almost certainly be put down to the high number
of deaths experienced (largely due to AIDS) by all families as well as the high rate of
migration. During the interviews, the extended family relationships and kinship
Pseudonym Age Sex School level Caregiver
Number in
household
Stella 18 F Dropped out
standard 4
(Head of household) 2
Joseph 16 M Standard 6 (Head of household) 2
Lucy 13 F Standard 7 (Head of household) 2
Mark 15 M Standard 7 Maternal
grandparents
3
Abbie 16 F Standard 6 Maternal
grandmother
3
Laila 16 F Standard 7 Paternal
grandmother
2
Rosa 12 F Standard 6 Paternal
grandmother
2
Max 13 M Standard 6 Paternal
grandmother
3
Katie 13 F Standard 5 Maternal aunt 5
Murat 15 M Standard 6 Maternal
grandmother
2
Eva 16 F Standard 7 Maternal
grandmother
2
Jane 16 F Standard 7 Maternal
grandmother
2
Table 1: Details of participating children
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networks were explored in detail, relatives living both locally and elsewhere. It was
clear that many families had suffered devastating losses. The caregivers interviewed
confirmed this experience. One of the caregivers, the aunt who is looking after 2
nieces and a nephew, stated: ‘We were born 11; all of them are dead except two of
us.’ She is not particularly old; she has one (6 year old) child of her own. Another care-
giver, a grandmother, has experienced the death of all of her own children:
The reason I am living with my granddaughter and the other two children is death. I was
blessed with five children in my marriage, two girls and three boys. . . . They are all gone;
the five of them there are down.
A third caregiver had raised 6 children to adulthood, 3 had died and a fourth had been
chronically ill for some months. Her youngest child is still in secondary school. Such a
death rate is truly excessive – it can be understood why those remaining alive live in
such small households: there is no one else left.
Kinship and extended family networks have been severely weakened by deaths,
shifting responsibility for childcare to grandparents and aunts. In some cases remaining
adult relatives are reluctant to take responsibility for orphans and consequently there are
a number of orphan-headed households exemplified by Stella, Joseph and Lucy. The
holes in the extended family safety net mean that caregivers have to turn elsewhere
for support. Most people in the community, however, are also poor and are not able
to help with items of larger expenditure (such as school fees) or long-term needs. Com-
munities have responded with the establishment of communal shambas for orphans
(reviving a practice started under ujamaa) or with small savings and credit groups,
but these meet only a fraction of the need.
The experiences of vulnerable children
The large flows of money from international donors have to be distributed, adminis-
tered, monitored and evaluated according to donor specifications. Participants from
each of the 3 groups noted that most of the aid given by civil society organisations
(funded by international donors) consists of items which promote access to edu-
cation for individual children: school uniforms, writing materials and, for secondary
school students, school fees. Some organisations also give out health insurance so
that the recipient is able to attend the hospital without paying user fees. Occasionally
organisations help with roofing material or they may provide mattresses and
bedding.
The targeting of individuals can be problematic. A 13-year-old orphaned girl, living
with her maternal aunt and 3 cousins describes what happened to her:
The organization has helped me twice with school uniform, but my cousins, they did not
get anything. They did not say anything to me, they just looked at me. I felt terrible
because I thought all of us would get. (Katie, 13 years)
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Children, caregivers and key informants reported that recruitment to the programmes
occurs in 2 ways. First the organisation may do research itself, going from house to
house to assess the needs. This research was described by the children and the caregivers
as ‘passing through’, and it tends to raise expectations that a donation will follow. These
expectations are often fuelled by promises from the organisation doing the research.
So there are certain people who went to our home and took our names and told us that a
donation will be coming. But I don’t know them, I didn’t recognise anybody, they are not
from our village. (Max 13 years)
Second the organisation may work through the village government and the Village
MVC committee to identify those needing assistance. Households caring for orphans
may register with the village office as potential candidates for aid. A combination of
these methods may also be used.
Some households fail to access aid – whether through failing to meet the criteria or
because the village government has identified them as not needing assistance. Children
in excluded households reported feeling distress when they see their friends receive
donations:
I feel terrible when the other orphans get a donation. I ask them how they do it, to get aid.
Fine, they tell me, but there at the office when they receive something, I think they deleted
my name. Grandmother is now fed up she has told me that even if they come and say you
are wanted at the office I am supposed to refuse. For example the day before yesterday my
friends went and they were given blankets, mattresses and others were given iron sheets.
Two days after I overheard them saying, “There is another orphan who has come from
Mbeya. But how do we know? We can say she is an orphan when in the actual sense
she is not.” So they ended up doubting my orphan status and the death of my mother
whom we mourn. (Rosa 12 years)
Stella, 18 years old at the time of the interview, had been caring for her brother since her
mother died when she was 10. Her only remaining aunt (mother’s sister) living in the
area at the time her mother’s death had rejected her because her mother died of AIDS.
Because she dropped out of school in order to make charcoal and cultivate food she was
not eligible for NGO programmes supplying school materials. One organisation did
however give her brother school uniform and writing materials. Shortly before the inter-
view, the organisation decided to cut the aid as her brother was now classed as having
an adult caregiver:
This time in June, they listed his name but said that now that I am old enough (18), this
year they will only give him a pair of shoes.
She was also ineligible for assistance according to the criteria of another organisation:
I wrote a letter to ask for a loan from one organization dealing with lending people money.
The loan officer came to our place and asked: ‘who will be your sponsor, someone who
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can pay back your loan in case you fail to pay back yourself?’ I did not have anyone so I
told them to just leave the loan if that was the case.
The girl and her brother are vulnerable in a number of ways: they have no relatives
willing to help them, they have no cash income, the girl’s health is poor since her
lungs have been damaged by the charcoal-making when she was young, and involve-
ment in a car accident left her with a badly broken upper arm that has limited her
ability to cultivate. Yet, in spite of their obvious vulnerability, they do not meet
the criteria for aid. The other children heading households, Joseph and Lucy, were
both in school and received uniforms for themselves. Each had also received a
once-off food parcel.
The experiences of caregivers
As mentioned above, the individualist nature of the aid can lead to conflict among the
villages. Other divisions in the community may also arise from perceived inequality
and exclusion. Caregivers attempted to access aid for the children in their care by regis-
tering them at the village office or, if possible, directly with the NGO. The NGO or
village government officers who apply the NGO criteria for deciding who is eligible
to receive a donation, in effect judge who is a ‘legitimate’ recipient and who is not;
they have the power to include or to exclude. Registration is not a sufficient condition
to be eligible for aid. Local government leaders state that they select ‘the most needy’,
but their definition of ‘the most needy’ is not always shared by those attempting to
access aid.
Yes there are some organizations which passed through, they took the names of those chil-
dren who are orphans and who are living in poor conditions, but we got nothing. So other
children they are getting help because sometimes there will be a lot of maize in the village
office. But they told me ‘you are able and you have a plot to cultivate so it’s not necessary
for you to get this help’. But I told them ‘this is not enough for me because also children
depend on me’. (Grandmother caregiver)
This grandmother was indeed very successful in cultivation. Elsewhere in the interview
she describes giving surplus food to neighbours at times, and using some of the surplus
to make pombe (the local brew) to sell for cash. However, when she compares herself to
others who receive aid, she feels that she is being treated unfairly.
When people try repeatedly to access aid and fail to do so, or are treated with con-
tempt, they may ‘give up’ trying or become passive in their situation. One grand-
mother caregiver described a situation where she felt she had been treated
contemptuously. She was called to fetch some aid and then made to wait for 12
hours. She watched other people receive clothes, mattresses and iron sheets for
roofing, but she was given only maize flour which she felt she did not need; what
she wanted was a mattress for her granddaughter who has to sleep on the floor.
When she complained she was told it was because she has health insurance, but she
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has to pay every time she goes to the hospital. She explained why she did not report
this to the village leaders:
We did not ask because all others who have health insurance have an ID. I just asked
myself why they say that I have health insurance while I am still paying for all my treat-
ments and I have not been given any ID. The reason why I think this is happening is that I
don’t have any relative there who can assist me to get my rights so whenever we complain
nobody bothers to make a follow-up to our complaints. I keep asking myself, even today,
which category the village leadership puts me in, even though they know that I have
nothing at all. Aid is sent to help us but when it reaches here people change and tell us
that we have health insurance. I just leave it to God.
Beyond a certain point it is no longer worth struggling to get aid, this woman has
reached that point and given up.
In some cases the caregivers will manipulate the system to try and access the aid.
They take names of the children at school. The problem is, if your child is well dressed
they don’t give him/her any aid. Some people dress their children badly so that they
look poor and get aid. (Grandmother caregiver)
Rather than seeking other solutions to their problems, they are prepared to take any
measure to access aid.
Local leaders’ response
With the emergence of so many aid agencies, the government’s role has changed from
service provision only to one of greater co-ordination of a multiplicity of service pro-
viders. District government requires NGOs to report to the relevant department in the
district administration, and, at stakeholder meetings, tries to organise a more equitable
geographical distribution of funds.4 UNICEF has played a significant co-ordination role
in selected districts.5 The role of local government has evolved into one of gate keeping
(deciding who is eligible to benefit from aid) with a reduced responsibility for service
provision (for example, establishing a communal shamba).
The way in which NGO and local government leaders interact with one another
seems to provide opportunities for expediency and corruption. In the following
example, the organisation had asked the village leadership to nominate a person to dis-
tribute the donations the organisation provided. A community leader described an inci-
dent that occurred during the distribution of school uniforms:
The co-ordinator (the NGO officer) was with the woman who is the main distributor
(appointed by village leadership). She took a pair of shoes and put it on her back under
her child who is not even walking yet. Some pupils saw her and started to complain as
4Interview with a district official.
5Interviews with a UNICEF co-ordinator and with a district official.
Forum for Development Studies 425
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
tsb
ibl
iot
ek
et 
i B
erg
en
] a
t 0
4:4
5 0
3 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
to why the distributor would hide a pair of shoes. It was reported to the co-ordinator, it had
become her habit to hide aid, but the co-ordinator refused to sack her. The children saw
her hide the shoes and she is now wearing them. What kind of a leader hides things she
was supposed to distribute to the needy? The way I see it the woman was somehow related
to the former village chairman. That is the reason she was not sacked. They reasoned that
by having that woman in the leadership, they will also benefit.
The individual nature of aid can result in conflict between villagers as is illustrated by
some of the participants in a focus group discussion:
P1: It does of course stimulate strife between those that have received and those that have
not.
P2: The one who doesn’t receive anything when others have received twice or three times
from the same aid organization normally complains to those who receive and not to the
distributors.
Other informants reported incidents where caregivers, frustrated at not receiving assist-
ance, would shout at neighbours returning with wheelbarrows full of donations. The
focus group participants went on to discuss their understanding of issues related to
the distribution of the aid:
P1: This situation is kindled by village leaders who only write the names of their own chil-
dren when registering true orphans. These names are then submitted to more than one aid
organization while true orphans are left out, or if lucky, then their name is submitted to at
least one aid organization. And the worst thing is that the left out children are the ones who
are in more difficult conditions. So there is too much favouritism in these services.
P2: When you ask them, they defend themselves by saying, ‘the number of orphans is
increasing every time but what I wrote is also correct’.
P3: The other problem is that there are many orphans such that not all are covered by aid.
Other unfortunate ones are always left out whenever aid organizations come. They are not
chosen when aid organizations pick criteria to sieve them for aid eligibility.
Besides expediency and corruption, local leaders identified other worrying effects of
the aid, notably a loss of self-reliance and initiative in solving problems along with
an increase in dependency. In an interview with an officer in an NGO, he explained
his understanding of dependency and its causes.
Many organizations do not allow the community to participate and therefore an attitude
of dependency has developed. People wait for the organization. How do you eliminate
this attitude? During the implementation of direct support, work with the community to
hear their contributions. But we need to study this attitude of dependence. The African
custom of helping each other – this spirit is leaving the community. How should we
collaborate with government structures at all levels to work and plan together with
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people in ideas which are introduced by themselves, not imposed on them. (NGO Tech-
nical Officer)
Direct support ‘imposed’ on the community (i.e. without participation) undermines the
community’s responsibility to solve its own problems. It may also cause the community
to step back from helping those who receive outside aid. The officer also suggests that
there should be collaboration with government and the grassroots community to solve
the problems, rather than having the donors’ solutions imposed on them.
Analysis and discussion
The small households found in Makete are an indication of deep vulnerability. Such
households are prone to poverty even if they have resources like a shamba because
they do not have enough people to work the land fully. They are also socially vulner-
able – if one of the two members leaves or dies the survival of the other is jeopardised.
These are fragile households and it is clear that they could benefit from aid.
Iatrogenic violence
The nature of the aid being given is a source of iatrogenic violence – the aid that is
meant to help vulnerable members of a community is itself causing social stress
(McFalls, 2010). Programmes and organisations are usually funded by Western
donors who bring with them assumptions about what programmes should encompass
and how they should be run. Both the nature of the aid and the method of distribution
have created tensions in the community.
The individualist nature of the aid is part of the problem. In the case of programmes
to help vulnerable children these usually provide uniforms and school materials for
selected individual children. When local government and NGO leaders are forced
(by donor requirements) to pick out individual beneficiaries, this enervates commitment
to the collectivist values of the community such as the obligation to help others. The
criteria seemingly benefit the lucky few, for example, the orphaned girl who was
given a school uniform while her cousins in the same household received nothing.
Others are excluded or deemed ineligible by the criteria causing conflict and strife
among community members. The content of the aid is decided by the donor organis-
ations acting as ‘benevolent dictators’ (McFalls, 2010): it is easy to measure how
many school uniforms are distributed so this facilitates accountability. However, aid
in the form of school uniforms – although it benefits some – excludes all those who
are not in school, and those who have dropped out of school are often the neediest.
Some caregivers, when they did receive aid, felt that it did not address the needs
they had prioritised. This is a case of the aid not fitting the circumstances of the reci-
pients as in the criticism levelled at aid under the Washington Consensus (Mawdsley
et al., 2014). Alternatively, expressed in terms of iatrogenic violence and therapeutic
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domination, the ‘violent’ impact was the separation experienced by the girl from the
family in which she lived; the exclusion of those not in school; and literal violence
and conflict experienced between neighbours. The aid has been given (‘the surgery
was successful’) and if any suffered the violence of separation or exclusion (‘the
patient died’) the blame is certainly not attributed to the donor (McFalls, 2010, p. 328).
The method of distribution is also problematic and causes unintended harm. Recruiting
teams created expectations when gathering information but not everyone who felt they
were eligible received aid. The criteria for inclusion and exclusion were not clearly under-
stood by the local community. Some households were seen to receive aid several times
while others received nothing and this led to conflict in the community with neighbours
shouting at each other. Other caregivers felt they had been treated with contempt and
this led to passivity. The involvement of local community leaders in the distribution of
aid led to opportunities for expediency causing further dissatisfaction and division in the
community. All these responses closely reflect McFalls’ (2010, p. 328) views of the
mode of resistance to therapeutic domination as ‘ . . . usually passive-aggressive, often
self-destructive, and occasionally prone to irrational outbursts . . . ’
Another example of iatrogenic violence is caused by both the nature of the aid and
the method of distribution, and that is dependency. The NGO Technical Officer who
spoke about dependency noted that community members are not allowed to participate
in deciding what the aid will comprise and how it will be distributed, they end up
‘waiting for the organisation’ – passively accepting what is given and at the same
time ceasing to take the initiative in seeking solutions (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).
As one of the caregivers described, individuals are also prepared to manipulate the
system (for example, by dressing their child to look more needy) in order to access
aid. Seckinelgin (2005, p. 361) calls this ‘external resource dependency’. Marsland
(2006) discusses the Tanzanian understanding of ‘participation’, in the context of ideo-
logical history, as the responsibility or obligation to contribute to the development of
the country, while the Western understanding of ‘participation’ has provided elites
with the opportunity to benefit at the expense of the marginalised (Mohan, 2002).
Another aspect of dependency is that the (short term) focus on aid through NGOs
replaces democratic expectations on government to make appropriate structural devel-
opments to address the peoples’ needs in the longer term by the underlying structural
causes of poverty. Nor does it provide an opportunity to work together to establish and
nurture a project that will sustain income, well-being and independence in the long run.
Seckinelgin (2005) suggests that there are long-term political implications, notably that
citizens are disconnected from the state, or, as Kinsella and Brehony (2009) put it, they
are ‘increasingly disengaged from political decision-making’.
Therapeutic domination
The fact that both the nature of aid and the method of its distribution have been deter-
mined by donors is an example of therapeutic domination. People’s attempts to access
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aid are controlled by the village leadership applying the criteria of PEPFAR and the
Global Fund. They have the power to judge that one person is a legitimate recipient of
aid, has the right to benefit while another is ineligible. All households caring for an
orphan can register at the village office and this makes them potential, but not necessarily
actual, recipients of aid. However, aid for orphan households has come to be seen as a
right, with the leaders – who know the circumstances of the residents – obliged to
distribute accordingly. One of the grandmothers quoted above referred to the fact that
she did not have a relative to assist her to get her rights and she saw that as the cause
of the contempt she was shown. The language of rights has been brought in by inter-
national aid agencies and Marriage (2006) contends that that this language is often
used to facilitate denial about what is really happening in aid programmes in order to
protect and sustain the flow of money. The language of rights has also inadvertently
led to a sense of dissatisfaction (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).
Exclusion or being judged as illegitimate to receive aid may be due to criteria or the
aid itself being inappropriate for the recipient community. As the 12-year-old girl
expressed it, her orphan status and the death of her mother were being questioned.
When the loan officer visited the home of the 18-year-old girl, he exposed her destitu-
tion – in the full sense of the concept in Africa: lack of family and lack of resources. As
personhood is defined in terms of family and kin relationships, he was effectively ques-
tioning her personhood. Her only defence in the face of such humiliation was to tell him
to just leave. When the aid agency that had been helping her brother withdrew their aid
because she had turned 18 and so was counted an adult, it was a case of lack of recog-
nition of her true situation, rejection of her ongoing vulnerability. The grandmother,
who waited 12 hours for a sack of maize meal when what she really needed was a mat-
tress for her granddaughter, felt she had been treated with contempt – her real needs
had not been understood or listened to and her anger was brushed off with a lie
about her access to free medical aid. These are examples of iatrogenic violence stem-
ming from therapeutic domination – the donors, backed by the power of the funds they
supply, decide on criteria and aid that do not fit the situation on the ground.
The aid in question here is targeting children made vulnerable by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. It clearly fits under several of the MDGs and should theoretically avoid
the characteristics of the Washington consensus that have been so heavily criticised,
such as large power-imbalances between donors and recipients (Mawdsley et al.,
2014). Instead it features many aspects of therapeutic domination: the power imbalance
inherent in the doctor–patient relationship is evident in the donor–recipient relation-
ship here (McFalls, 2010). This imbalance or lop-sidedness confirms that HIV/AIDS
funding in this case fits more closely with humanitarian aid than with post-Washington
consensus conditions (McFalls, 2010; Seckinelgin, 2012). In other words, more than 3
decades into the epidemic, HIV/AIDS is still seen as an ‘emergency’ situation requiring
relief aid. While the short-term needs of some vulnerable individuals may be met, the
requirements for long-term survival in this particular socio-cultural environment and
the underlying causes of vulnerability are not being addressed (Seckinelgin, 2005).
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The current perspective allows the aid agencies to avoid ethical questioning about their
methods, they are taken as ‘doing good’: the ‘benevolent dictatorship’ in action
(McFalls, 2010). The findings presented above give examples of iatrogenic violence –
although the aid is intended to help children and support caregivers, the experience of
children is often exclusion, and the experience of caregivers is often conflict.
Conclusion
This article has explored the recipient side of donor–recipient relationships in humanitar-
ian aid targeting children affected by HIV/AIDS by studying the lived experiences of
children, caregivers and community members as well as the responses of local leaders
in Makete, Tanzania. The findings reveal numerous examples of social disruption and
unintended harm caused by the aid itself, for example, conflict between those who
receive aid and those who do not, criteria that exclude the most needy, passive responses
to contempt and an increase in dependency with a corresponding decline in self-reliance.
These examples of iatrogenic violence reflect therapeutic domination by donors: donors,
with little or no participation by community members, decide on the type of aid and the
method of distribution that do not fit the local conditions. Donor–recipient relationships
in the context of aid to vulnerable children are generating inadvertent side-effects remi-
niscent of those that generated criticism under the Washington Consensus.
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